ABSTRACT.
exploring the issue in depth I hope to provide a framework with which to view the issue neutrally. I address whether it ought to be illegal to sell organs, as it is for most of the world, what that means for donors and recipients, and whether the sale of organs is, or could be, safe and efficient.
With better understanding of the nature of organ rejection and development of the techniques and technology necessary to perform transplantation, the first few successful organ transplants with live human subjects took place throughout the 1960s. Since then, the human organ procurement system has been the source of both physical and emotional trauma for a great many people, especially candidates for transplant procedures. The nearly unanimously implemented system that exists at present is a simple voluntary donation mechanism, where organs are given either after death or during life in the case of those that are not needed by the donor to survive (one of two kidneys and portions of the lungs and liver). Donating to a specific person sidesteps the issue of waiting on a long list for an organ and is more frequently practiced between family members, whereas donating to a non-relative is not as commonplace. Waiting for an organ from an unrelated donor can take months or even years depending on the organ and availability. Thousands of people die every year waiting for a kidney, heart, liver, or other organ, and there are a growing number of people on the waiting list for transplants.
An undisputed characteristic of the existing organ procurement system is that the demand is much greater than the supply. As a result, the price of black market organs is driven up 1 , and law-abiding citizens on the waiting list are often not helped. While many of the organs donated to unrelated people are from individuals who decided while they were alive to donate their organs upon death, in spite of their noble efforts there is still a supply-side shortage (Banks 1995 Furthermore the potential long term health risks are seldom fully explained to, or appreciated by, the organ seller. According to one report, individuals are compensated anywhere from $6,000 to $10,000 plus airfare on the high end ($800 on the low end) for one of their kidneys, which is then sold by a black market middleman for anywhere up to 4 In one documented case, a seventeen-year-old boy in China told a local television station that he sold his kidney for the money to buy an iPad (Patience 2011 ).
$100,000 (Corwin 2011).
5
In the United States, a black market has existed for tissue, where black market brokers made deals with funeral home owners and directors to harvest tissues and parts from bodies in their possession without the consent of the individual or family. These were then sold for a profit to researchers and doctors; false reports were sometimes created to cover up the true cause of death and the fact that the tissues could be diseased.
The public stigma that surrounds the black market is enough to convince many to wait it out legally, even if it means death (Goodwin 2006) . In certain cases, potential organ recipients are also deterred by the uncertainties surrounding a black market transplant in a foreign country, where the quality of both the organ and medical care is questionable. At the same time, the presence of the black market actively undermines the legal organ donation and procurement system, What are the arguments for a non-commoditized altruistic system which depends on donations and not on compensation? Relying on altruistic motives is indeed compelling. For many cultures, the body is regarded as a sacred entity and donating an organ honors this sacralization of bodily resources, whereas the sale of organs is regarded by most cultures to be taboo. And so one argument for maintaining the status quo is that, out of the range of policies that could be implemented, a ban on organ selling and a procurement system based on donations only is the most culturally acceptable and therefore the most politically viable policy. Put another way, the concern, following Titmuss' logic, is that monetization destroys altruistic motives and thus decreases supply. Healey writes about commoditization (or monetization) as follows:
We get what we wish for. If we talk of blood as if it were a commodity, then people will come to commodify it in practice. By instituting a market for blood or organs, people orient themselves toward these goods in a new way. The rational calculus of costs and benefits comes to override alternative ways of thinking about the value of what is being exchanged (Healey 11, 2006) .
If an organ sales market was adopted, Healey argues that the key to its success is fairness of the exchange, such that the poor are not exploited and the many that 6 Titmuss explains, as evidence of the crowding out effect, that the amount of blood donated and the number of people who donated increased in the United Kingdom, where the sale of blood was prohibited, while these numbers declined in the United States, where the sale of blood was allowed. And so we observe, the sale of blood wears away the incentive to give (Titmuss 1971 On a separate but related point, he argues:
The transplantation of organs, which at first sight appears to be just a technical medical action, is first and foremost a socio-cultural act, in which two aspects of exchange operate. One is concrete and conscious, while the other is abstract and subconscious Barnett, Beard, and Kaserman (1993) critique the present system, and argue that doctors and medical professionals oppose organ sale technology because they have a financial stake in maintaining the status quo. Concerning the vested interests of such professionals, the authors write:
The ongoing shortage of kidneys, hearts, livers, lungs, and other solid organs has significantly hampered the ability of physicians to bring improved life-saving transplant technology to patients suffering from a variety of debilitating and often fatal diseases… opposition to the formation of organ markets has been quite strong among transplant suppliers (both hospital and physician groups) (Barnett, Beard, and Kaserman, 1993) .
One of the concerns associated with any organ procurement system is the many who are exploited by black market systems, where organs can be taken without full and fair consent or indeed any permission at all. In certain cases, especially when the donation is needed for a family member, the opposite may be true; Shanteau and Harris (1990) write:
One possible explanation is that the earthly rewards for being a donor can only be experienced while living, not after death. With a relative, a donation would directly benefit a known other person. If a close relative's life is saved, then the donor would still be alive to share in the experience. A donation after death cannot produce a similar experience. Therefore, the opportunity to see the rewards of donation may provide an added motivation (Shanteau and Harris 65, 1990 ).
Contemporary sociologists including Michele Goodwin in Black Markets:
The Supply and Demand of Body Parts (2006) have criticized the present system, pointing out that where there is a gift-relationship procurement system, a thriving black market also exists. Goodwin also argues that poor African American communities are especially ill-served by black markets. There are simply no guarantees that either regulation or marketization would alleviate black market use rates and supply-side shortages. Consider that a black market prospers even in Iran where the government regulates kidney pricing; black market use there (even for kidneys) has not been eliminated or even substantially limited.
I have referred to the sales of organs multiple times throughout this paper.
With reference to such a system, Jason Altman (2007) The major roadblocks to increased transplantation are lack of donor organs and financing… For almost all organs, supply cannot keep up with demand, and demand is increasing. There is little hope that the current "altruistic" system will be able to keep up with either existing or emerging demand… market forces [are] a method of both generating an adequate supply of transplant organs and ensuring that the supply is efficiently used (Schwindt and Vining 483, 1986 ). Rothman and Rothman (2006) further write that establishing a market for organs has already garnered significant support. They note that the problem with such a market has to do with how to avoid the ethical failures of the present system, and how to prevent the inefficiencies associated with crowding out, which would wear away at the moral fabric of a system in which the poor are exploited.
The market for blood and reproductive cells tells a quite different story than that of the organ procurement system; it is comparatively easy to donate these bodily resources, the donor does not risk his or her health by donating and these resources are replenished or at least not as necessary to the donor's health and survival as an organ. Feldschuh in Safe Blood (1998) explains one difference between blood transfusion and organ transplantation when he writes:
If you have your own frozen stored blood available, proper full replacement can take place. A doctor who knows that you have stored your own risk-free blood should not hesitate to provide you with complete replacement when you lose blood (Feldschuh 160, 1998 ).
Giving blood is not the same as donating or selling an organ because the latter carries significantly greater risks to the donor (or seller) and because blood is a renewable resource, whereas organs (excluding the liver) are not. Blood is more readily available, sold more frequently, and sold legally in the United States; there is less of a taboo against doing so.
The prevailing practice in the United States and most other countries is to procure organs from donations, and to keep those in need of an organ waiting on a list for a legal, donated organ. The prevailing thought behind the arguments in favor of permitting organ sales or offering financial and other incentives for organ donations is that more organs will then be made available for transplant (Becker and Elias 2007) . Of course, it should be noted that selling organs or adding incentives has the potential to increase the medical and administrative costs associated with the transplantation itself and the extensive care required following transplantation, because we live in a health care system where costs for almost everything related to health have greatly increased over time. The focus on economic factors must also, for these reasons, be evaluated in the broader social and cultural context (Barnett, Beard, Kaserman 1993, 669-678).
Iran is the only country that has adopted a formal, government-regulated system for kidney sales. One Iranian surgeon familiar with the program describes it as follows:
There is no commercialism. There are no middlemen or companies to sell the kidneys. Another way to increase donations and organ supplies without financial or other incentives is through presumed consent. In some European countries (including Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, and Sweden), when someone dies that person is presumed to have consented to donate any usable organs. This form of consent is overridden only if the person specifically makes it clear that he or she does not want to participate in donating organs after death. Such a system is referred to as an "opt-out" consent system. In these countries we know that organ availability increases alongside substantially increased donation rates (Ariely 2011 ). In the United States, we have the opposite system -a person has to "opt-in" to organ donation after his death and make that consent known prior to his death. Religious practices and institutions also play a part in the donation process. Religious approval can be crucial to those potential donors who rely on their religion to tell them that donations are allowed and morally appropriate. In that respect Kieran Healey notes:
But insofar as the donor is dead and there is no money involved, most Christian church authorities are not against organ donation… Orthodox Judaism, however, has had more trouble assimilating organ donation to existing law and practice. There is more opposition to organ donation, and religious authority is more divided on the issue…Once church leaders had satisfied themselves that brain death was a valid concept, they no longer opposed organ donation. All major Christian denominations came to support donation and transplantation as a morally valuable activity. (Healey 31-32, 2006 .)
The fact that there would probably be serious religious backlash to the marketization of organs must be included in the calculation of whether such a market should be permitted. Such a change in the way organs are procured would reflect a fundamental change in the morality of the act in the eyes of many religious authorities.
In addition to making use of presumed consent and being sensitive to cultural and religious attitudes, donations could be increased by making payments to donors in ways that take into account the expressive role of money.
Sociologists studying this issue have determined that there is invariably a place for paying donors so long as you do it the right way. For example, transplant institutions (including governments that want to encourage donations) might be able to offer certain forms of financial incentives to the families of dead persons in order to promote donations, so long as these incentives are sensitive to the expressive role of money. One suggested solution is to offer money for funeral expenses to families who agree to organ donations, enabling families to honor their deceased relative. Such a solution allows for honorific exchange as opposed to market exchange, and further incentivizes those who supply an organ (Becker and Elias 2007).
Eurotransplant, an independent and collaborative organization that supports international donor exchange, has suggested as an incentive that living donors be placed higher on the transplant waiting list if they ever need a kidney later on in their lives. In Israel (as in Iran), there is a system where donors receive a fixed amount of compensation from the government. There is also a government-sponsored education budget to inform the public about organ donation 10 . In tune with the religious spirit of the nation and to protect the sacralization of organs, the laws in Israel effectively ban the trade of organs while also facilitating the aforementioned legal alternative (Ratzlav-Katz 2011).
Additional incentives proposed in Israel include government-granted income for donors, municipal tax exemptions, free public transportation, tuition grants, free passes to public parks, and the granting of an honorific certificate.
Within the framework of a non-market system, another idea for increasing the supply of organs and further incentivizing donations is through a futures market (Healey 2006 ). The idea is that people agree while they are still alive to donate their organs when they die, in exchange for a small payment they receive while they are still alive. An alternative futures market system is one where individuals agree to donate their organs after death in exchange for payment made at the time of their death to their relatives or to a charity. These compensation systems avoid the many complications and potential abuses of taking organs from a live donor (Healy 2006, 35-36 ).
Financial compensation for donations could also be increased by broadening the kind of expenses that are reimbursed to donors. An organ donor 10 The public's unwillingness to donate organs in Israel and other countries is related to the fear that doctors will declare a patient's death prematurely in order to collect organs and even profit from them. For that reason polls in Israel show that less than 50 percent of the population is willing to donate. Money spent on public education has the potential to increase that number. . Given that present procurement systems permit black markets to operate, how are these black markets changing? With a growing population in need of organs, greater ability to save lives through transplantation, and substantial unmet need, the black market is growing to fill the void.
World-systems theory divides countries into core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral countries. Core countries continue to benefit from a risk averse and laissez faire approach to organ governance (as contrasted to the riskier strategy involving regulation). The need is for transformative policy to intervene and promote an ethos of fairness and camaraderie that transcends national interest (Barnett, Beard, Kaserman 2002) . If organ supplies can be increased legally, it follows that fewer people would resort to the black market.
In the case of a sales market the general concern is that peripheral countries will be crowded out of the market by wealthier core countries, simply because these actors have more money. What is to stop someone living in poverty in India from selling an organ to the highest bidder in the United States? How will people in India in need of organs compete with wealthier transplant recipients from other countries? Governments would need to cooperate to create a market with enough regulation that it provides fair and adequate compensation to organ suppliers while distributing organs to everyone in need, not just to the well to do.
The distinction between acquisition and allocation is noted here, because if the distribution of organs is regulated governments become the middlemen and gatekeepers by which goods are obtained or acquired early in the transference process, and allocated or apportioned later on in the process. Regulatory pressures could, as is the case in Iran, create a more equitable distribution of organs which does not depend on the ability to pay a premium. Where the policy is the best fit for the greatest number of individuals, the laws should follow.
CONCLUSION
While a number of sociologists have studied organ procurement and recommended systems including the status quo, systems that make use of additional, appropriate compensation, and even systems that would legalize the outright sale of organs, there is little unanimity as to the direction in which we should head. Choosing a best policy is no simple task because it is difficult to predict future market behavior which is inherently uncertain; the accuracy of riskassessment strategies is indeed fallible. Permitting the sale of organs perhaps has the potential to give life to those in need of organs and financial compensation to those willing to give. With so much at stake, so-called risk averse strategies are themselves risky.
However, a significant problem with predictive strategies which purport to solve the failures of any system is that the effects of a policy are inherently unpredictable and unknowable until that policy is implemented. Then, is the best policy the one which assumes the least uncertainty (e.g. the status quo)? The exact details about how a newly implemented organ procurement system would play out are beyond the scope and speculation of this paper. That said, the evidence that presumed consent systems work well (and would work well if implemented elsewhere) is especially noted because this approach provides a solution, in part, to the supply-side shortage without degrading the gift narrative. This is the approach I recommend -maintaining the gift narrative and organ donation system while adopting presumed consent to increase donations after death. I would also permit financial payments for donors' funeral expenses and their medical and other costs, including future costs, associated with donation and transplantation. Consider the negative implications of implementing a policy that permits the sale of organs. With the desacralization of the human body into distinct parts that can be sold, what is to prevent further degradation of the moral structure surrounding organ donations and a system which denies our basic notions of sacralization? The sale of organs would mark a paradigmatic shift after which the potential abuse and misuse of the laws could lead to even greater numbers using the black market, especially if the price of an organ is particularly high in the legal market.
Is the current organ procurement system a rational response to present conditions? On the one hand, the present system based on donations seems to operate within a morally acceptable framework. But its inability to come anywhere close to satisfying demand for transplant organs also gives rise to an independent black market, which in turn exploits poor people, enriches brokers and hospitals, and undermines the legal system. The most rational response should be one that results in the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of people. I encourage the addition of presumed consent and financial reimbursements as an effective solution to the ills of the present supply-side shortage. I do not recommend increasing financial incentives to such an extent that the organ donation is transformed from a gift to a commodity.
Institutions have influenced the economics of organ exchange, and through a process of trial and error, have developed a cultural account of altruistic donation designed to convince people to donate organs. These institutions have a continued and significant role in the organ procurement system. Altruism may have its limits, but the sale of organs would by no means guarantee improvement on such limits. I conclude that the sale of organs would likely fall short of the gift narrative, supported by the policy of presumed consent and appropriate financial incentives, in its ability and potential to limit both the use of the black market and exploitation of the poor while making progress to increase the much-needed supplies of legitimately obtained organs for all those in need.
